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a b s t r a c t
The political acceptability of climate policies is undermined by job-killing arguments, espe-
cially for the least-skilled workers. However, evidence of the distributional impacts for differ-
ent workers remains scant. We examine the associations between climate policies, proxied
by energy prices, and workforce skills for 14 European countries and 15 industrial sectors
over the period 1995–2011. Using a shift-share instrumental variable estimator and control-
ling for the inﬂuence of automation and globalization, we ﬁnd that climate policies have been
skill biased against manual workers and have favoured technicians. The long-term change
in energy prices accounted for between 9.2% and 17.5% (resp. 4.2% and 8.0%) of the increase
(resp. decrease) in the share of technicians (resp. manual workers).
© 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
Concerns about international competitiveness and job losses have often characterized the political debate over climate poli-
cies. The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement is only the latest episode of a political discourse that, especially
among the conservative parties, has exploited the job-killing argument to block the approval of ambitious climate policies
(Coglianese et al., 2014). Cragg et al. (2013) showed that US Congressional representatives are less inclined to vote for cli-
mate policies if they were elected from areas that are both poorer and have a pollution-intensive industrial structure. While
the job-killing argument is less popular in the European debate, generous exemptions have been adopted in all countries to
shelter polluting industries from international competition (Ekins and Speck, 1999). According to Martin et al. (2014), policy-
makers have overstated the relocation risk produced by the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), which is the ﬂag-
ship EU policy on climate change mitigation. Empirical evidence has not disconﬁrmed these concerns: in most cases, air qual-
ity regulations and energy prices (a proxy for carbon taxes) have modest negative employment effects that are concentrated
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among polluting and energy-intensive industries (e.g. Greenstone, 2002; Kahn and Mansur, 2013; Walker, 2011). Although
such negative effects can be offset by well-designed tax recycling schemes (Yamazaki, 2017), direct subsidies to the green
economy (Vona et al., forthcoming) and induced innovations (Horbach and Rennings, 2013; Gagliardi et al., 2016), climate
policies can still have large distributional consequences for different groups of workers, undermining the policies’ political
acceptability.
Of particular importance is assessing whether the labour market impacts of climate policies reinforce the well-known sec-
ular trend of skill upgrading induced by globalization and automation (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Goos et al., 2014; Lu and
Ng, 2013; Autor et al., 2013). Regarding information and communication technology (ICT henceforth), ﬁrms exposed to strin-
gent climate policies could adopt technologies and organizational practices that require different worker competencies. Ulti-
mately, whether climate policies and the greening of our economies induce changes in skill demand and the extent to which
these changes are aligned with those of on-going technological transformations are empirical issues that our paper seeks to
answer.
The ﬁrst step of our research is to provide an exploratory examination of how the adoption of climate policies interacts with
other labour market trends in shaping long-term changes in workforce composition. Indeed, reemployment opportunities for
displaced workers depend on their skill sets and are likely less promising for workers whose competencies are offshored or
automated. Conversely, workers equipped with the competencies needed in new green jobs will beneﬁt from the expansion in
the demand for green goods and services induced by such policies (Vona et al., forthcoming).
We contribute in three ways to the scant empirical literature on the distributional impacts of environmental policies
across different worker groups, which has mostly been limited to the US (Walker, 2011; Vona et al., 2018). First, we expand
the breadth and generality of previous works by considering a more aggregated level of analysis. Speciﬁcally, we exam-
ine the associations between climate policies and workforce skills for 14 European countries and 15 industrial sectors over
the period 1995–2011. Similar to previous research on the impact of ICT (Michaels et al., 2014), this approach allows us
to examine within-sector cross-country differences in the associations between climate policies and labour demand by skill
group.
Second, we build a unique dataset containing information on exposure to climate policies, green innovations and other
structural changes, essentially trade and (ICT and non-ICT) capital investments (section 2). On the one hand, this dataset allows
us to isolate the effects of climate policies onworkforce skills in our econometric analyses. On the other hand, we gain descriptive
insights into how climate policies interact with other structural transformations in the labourmarket. We use cluster analysis to
assign each sector-country pair to a group representing the combined exposure to different structural transformations, including
those related to climate change (section 3). In this way, we are able to capture the overlap of such structural transformations
and thus the potentially cumulative effects of present and future climate policies.
Third, we estimate the effects of climate policies, proxied by energy prices as in Sato et al. (2019), on workforce skills. In
doing so, we isolate the effects of energy prices by controlling for time invariant sector-by-country characteristics as well as for
sector-, country- and cluster-speciﬁc time trends. We address the residual concerns regarding the endogeneity of energy prices
(i.e., time-varying omitted variables, such as quantity discounts) using a standard shift-share instrument. We ﬁnd that properly
accounting for endogeneity changes only the magnitude of the estimated effects and that, if anything, ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates are downward biased.
There are three main notable results from our analysis. First, the cluster analysis shows that clusters exposed to climate poli-
cies (with higher GHG emissions intensity) and to other structural transformations (i.e., trade exposed) are not necessarily at
a disadvantage relative to other clusters. Second, the large increase in energy prices that occurred between 1995 and 2011 did
not exacerbate the employment decline of polluting sectors. Third, the main ﬁnding of our paper is that a weak and insigniﬁcant
effect of energy prices on total employmentmasks signiﬁcant heterogeneity across occupational groups, with a pronounced skill
bias in favour of technicians and againstmanual workers. The historical increase in energy prices explains only a modest fraction
(i.e., between 4.2% and 8.0%) of the large decline in the share of manual workers’ employment between 2011 and 1995. By con-
trast, the effect of energy prices on technicians ranges between 9.2% and 17.5%. Compared to other structural transformations,
a peculiar aspect of climate policies is that the bias in favour of abstract occupations is concentrated among technical occupa-
tions (ISCO 3), such as Physical and Engineering Science Technicians, Process Control Technicians and Government Regulatory
Associate Professionals.
1.1. Related literature
Our paper contributes to the active literature on the impacts of environmental policies on competitiveness (Dechezleprêtre
and Sato, 2017), of which labour market impacts are an expression (Berck and Hoffmann, 2002). The following two contrasting
hypotheses are tested: the Pollution Haven hypothesis (e.g. Levinson and Taylor, 2008) and the Porter hypothesis (e.g. Porter
and van der Linde, 1995). The former focuses on the increase in compliance costs induced by unilateral environmental poli-
cies that eventually lead to a relocation of pollution-intensive industries towards countries with less-stringent policies. The
latter emphasizes the dynamic incentives of strict, but ﬂexible, environmental policies for green innovation (weak version) and
competitiveness (strong version).
Both hypotheses have important implications for labour market outcomes. As emphasized by the partial equilibrium model
of Berman and Bui (2001), the extent to which the Pollution Haven effect translates into job losses depends on the size of
the scale effect induced by compliance costs, the labour intensity of abatement technologies and the degree of competition
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in product markets. Morgenstern et al. (2002) showed that the scale effect is small since ﬁrms have market power in pollut-
ing industries. Consequently, the increase in compliance costs can be passed on to consumers with negligible effects on total
demand. The Porter hypothesis can be nested within this framework by allowing for innovation in abatement technologies that
creates a green comparative advantage, possibly leading to net job creation (see, e.g., Fankhaeser et al., 2008).
Overall, the aggregate effect of environmental policies on labour demand remains a largely unresolved empirical issue. On
the one hand, the literature isolating the effects onmost cost-exposed polluting industries has generally found negative employ-
ment effects (e.g., Greenstone, 2002; Walker, 2011; Kahn and Mansur, 2013; Marin and Vona, 2017).1 On the other hand, the
literature focusing on green innovation has generally found a positive correlation between employment and policies (e.g., Ren-
nings et al., 2004; Horbach and Rennings, 2013; Gagliardi et al., 2016; Vona et al., forthcoming). The main diﬃculty in reconciling
the empirical ﬁndings of the two streams of literature is that it is easier to derive a reduced-form speciﬁcation, identify a reliable
control group and thus obtain the causal effects in the ﬁrst strand of literature than in the second. Moreover, job destruction
in polluting sectors can be offset by job creation in upstream suppliers of green technologies and services, which are diﬃcult
to assess in reduced-form econometric models. Finally, the timing of the effect is important because the offsetting mechanisms
operating through innovation are likely to be effective in themedium to long term, while the increase in compliance costs occurs
immediately (e.g., Lanoie et al., 2008).
These strands of the literature have thus far focused on the aggregate employment impacts, but the impact of structural
transformations can be highly skill biased. Examining skill-biased impacts has been crucial to understanding the inequality-
enhancing effects of globalization and ICT (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Goos et al., 2014). In developed countries, all of these
transformations have reduced the demand for unskilled labour and routine jobs while increasing that for highly skilled labour
and abstract jobs, especially those that require social skills (Deming, 2017).
Analogous to these ﬁrst-order structural transformations, a key and yet unexplored question is whether the labour market
impacts of environmental policies are biased towards certain groups of workers and whether the direction of the bias is similar
to that of these changes. Answering these questions is crucial for two reasons. First, identifying the losers and supporting them
during the transition to a new job would signiﬁcantly increase the political acceptability of climate policies (Vona et al., forth-
coming). Second, training workers with the skills required by green jobs would reduce the costs of coping with climate policies
by easing the adoption and the development of green innovations.
Despite the active policy debate on green jobs and skills (Martinez-Fernandez et al., 2010; Deschenes, 2013), empirical
research on the skill biasedness of environmental policies remains scant and mostly limited to the US. Indirect evidence
has been provided in three cross-sectional studies analysing the skill biasedness of green production. Using the US Green
Goods and Services Survey, available for 2010 and 2011, Becker and Shadbegian (2009) and Elliott and Lindley (2017) found
that plants producing green goods and services employ a lower share of production workers. Consoli et al. (2016) examined
the skill difference between green and non-green jobs using standard skill measures, such as education and routine task
intensity, based on data from the Occupational Information Network (O∗NET), which contains detailed information on the
skill and task content of approximately 1000 occupations. They generally found modest differences but also a bias towards
higher skills for green jobs (see also Bowen et al., 2018). Vona et al. (2018) was the ﬁrst paper to provide a direct test of
the effect of recent amendments to the Clean Air Act on skill demand in US regions over the period 2006–2014. Extend-
ing the nuanced results of Consoli et al. (2016) obtained using standard skill measures, they also used O∗NET to identify the
skills that are signiﬁcantly different between green jobs and other jobs. The key ﬁnding is that skill gaps tend to be relevant,
especially for engineering and technical skills, including monitoring. Taking stock of these ﬁndings, we expect climate poli-
cies to amplify the long-term skill upgrading of the workforce, with a more pronounced effect for engineering and technical
skills.
2. Data, measures and descriptive statistics
2.1. Data and measures
We use standard data sources that, to the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to combine in a unique dataset. Our ﬁnal
dataset includes 15 sectors: 13manufacturing sectors, “mining and quarrying”, and “electricity, gas and water supply”, classiﬁed
according to the NACE rev. 1.1 classiﬁcation.2 Due tomissing data on key variables described below, we focus on 14 EU countries
only.3 The resulting dataset is a balanced panel for 15 industrial sectors and 14 countries over the period 1995–2011.4
1 For the UK and Germany, however, existing research ﬁnds no negative employment effect even in polluting industries (Cole and Elliott, 2007; Martin et al.,
2014; Petrick and Wagner, 2014).
2 We excluded “construction” (NACE F), which is very different from other sectors in two important dimensions. First, it is an outlier in terms of employment.
Second, it is sheltered by other drivers, such as international competition and automation.
3 The countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Over the period 1995–2011, these countries accounted for approximately 73.7% of employment and 92.3% of value added of the EU27 in the
selected sectors. Data on ICT and non-ICT capital from EUKLEMS are not available for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal,
Romania and Slovakia. Moreover, data on import penetration (OECD) are missing for Luxembourg, while data on EPS (OECD) are not available for Slovenia.
4 We limit our analysis to the period 1995–2011, as data fromWIOD (i.e., energy mix and total hours worked) is only available (with NACE rev. 1.1 classiﬁca-
tion) until 2011.
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Our primary measure of sectoral exposure to climate policies is emissions intensity, measured in terms of actual green-
house gas emissions. The data source is the World Input Output Dataset (WIOD), which allows us to compute both the direct
GHG emissions (CO2, N2O and CH4 aggregated according to their global warming potential) of the sector-country and the (indi-
rect) GHG emissions embodied in the electricity purchased from the power sector (using input-output technical coeﬃcients),
as the cost of climate policy in the power sector is usually passed-through to industrial and ﬁnal consumers (see, e.g., Sijm
et al., 2006). Our measure is the sum of the direct and indirect emissions (from the power sector) per unit of the sectoral
value added.5 Because sectors producing green goods and technologies can beneﬁt from climate policies and can be sources
of job creation through an increase in the demand for green machines and services, we build a second measure of exposure
to climate policies, namely, the stock of climate-related patent applications at the European Patent Oﬃce from REGPAT as
a proxy for green comparative advantage.6 Climate-related patents are identiﬁed based on their IPC and CPC codes accord-
ing to the taxonomy developed by the OECD (ENV-TECH indicator) and are related to renewable energy sources, energy eﬃ-
ciency, carbon capture and storage, emission mitigation technologies (e.g., energy storage, hydrogen-based fuels, fuel cells)
and eﬃcient combustion technologies (see Hašcˇicˇ and Migotto, 2015). We use the IPC-ISIC concordance proposed by Lybbert
and Zolas (2014) to attribute climate-related patents to each sector. In this way, patents are assigned to sectors that manu-
facture the green technology rather than to the sectors that use it, thus capturing the comparative advantage in green tech-
nologies. We measure environmental patent intensity by rescaling the patent stock by the number of hours worked in the
sectors.
On the labour market side, we use the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) to retrieve, for each industry, informa-
tion about the total hours worked and the share of hours worked by workers in different “skill groups”.7 Our favoured mea-
sure of skills is the share of workers employed in a certain occupational group, while our alternative measure breaks down
the workforce by educational category. This choice reﬂects the ﬁndings of the recent literature in labour economics empha-
sizing that occupational categories have greater predictive power than educational categories for labour market outcomes
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). We focus our analysis on four occupational groups: managers (ISCO 1), professionals (ISCO 2),
technicians (ISCO 3) and manual workers (ISCO 7, 8 and 9). The paper by Vona et al. (2018), which empirically identiﬁes the
skills relevant for green and brown jobs, motivates the separate inclusion of professionals, managers and technicians. Engi-
neering and design skills emerge as the most important skills for both the green and polluting sectors. We include the share
of managers because both Vona et al. (2018) and Martin et al. (2012) found managerial skills to be important for environ-
mentally friendly production. Routine manual workers are included because they are both intensively employed in polluting
industries and negatively affected by trade and technology drivers (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al., 2013). The second
skill measure breaks down different levels of educational attainment as follows: low skill (secondary International Standard
Classiﬁcation of Education, ISCED, level or less), medium skill (upper-secondary ISCED level) and high skill (tertiary ISCED
level).8
EU-KLEMS provides information on ICT and non-ICT capital and labour productivity (until 2007). We retrieved from OECD
STAN (data available until 2009) import penetration measured as the ratio of imports to total domestic consumption (i.e., net
imports plus gross domestic production), which is a conventional measure of import competition. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, ICTs and globalization have large labourmarket impacts, and a key goal of our analysis is to understand the extent to which
these impacts overlap with those of climate policies.
While several environmental policies potentially affect sectoral performance, most of them vary at the country or EU level,
and thus, their effects is diﬃcult to isolate from those of other country-speciﬁc factors. Further, the stringency of the ﬂagship
climate policy of the EU, i.e., the Emission Trading Scheme, was weak over the period considered in our analysis. We hence
focus on energy prices that, following an active strand of the literature (Deschenes, 2013; Aldy and Pizer, 2015; Marin and Vona,
2017; Sato et al., 2019), can be used to proxy for what would happen if an ambitious carbon pricing scheme were adopted.
We follow the methodology of Sato et al. (2019) and estimate energy prices (country, sector and year speciﬁc) by combining
country-level, time-varying, tax-inclusive prices for each energy source (from IEA) with the sector-country-year speciﬁc energy
mix (fromWIOD). Our measure of energy prices is thus a weighted average of prices for different energy sources.9
We assess the robustness of our results to the inclusion of other environmental policies by including, in an extension of our
main speciﬁcation, the OECD index of Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS), which aggregates a wide array of policies such as
subsidies, taxes and emission limits (see Botta and Koz´luk, 2014, for details).
5 We use emissions rather than energy intensity. The two measures show a correlation of 0.91 in our sample.
6 The stock is built with the perpetual inventory method using the EPO patent count sorted by priority year from 1977. We apply a 20% depreciation rate.
7 The Labour Force Survey employs the NACE rev 1.1. classiﬁcation until 2007 and the NACE rev. 2 classiﬁcation from 2007 onwards. We build a country-
speciﬁc weighted concordance table between the two classiﬁcations, exploiting the double coding of information for 2007.
8 The occupational groups not considered in our analysis, such as clerical (ISCO 4) and service occupations (ISCO 5), represent a tiny proportion of employment
in the sectors considered by our analysis, i.e., 10.6% of the average industry workforce.
9 Speciﬁcally:
pE
ijt
=
∑
k
𝜙k
ijt
pk
it
where 𝜙k
ijt
is the share of energy source k (electricity, gas, coal, oil) in country i and sector j, while pk
it
is corresponding price of energy source k (see Sato et al.,
2019, for details).
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Since some variables are available only until 2007 (i.e., ICT and non-ICT capital), our descriptive analysis in the next section
is performed for the period 1995–2007, while the econometric part in section 4 also uses more recent years up to 2011 because
we set the exposure to various structural drivers at the initial period.
2.2. Preliminary descriptive evidence
Table 1 summarizes the main data sources and the acronyms of the variables that are used throughout the paper, and it
presents basic descriptive statistics for our variables of interest.
As a ﬁrst attempt to understand the associations between climate policies and labour market outcomes, we correlate both
the levels (Table 2) and long-term changes (Table 3) of our variables of interest. We highlight in italics the correlations that are
not signiﬁcantly different from zero (p-value< 0.05). Examining the levels, the patterns for the two measures of exposure to
climate policies are completely different. On the one hand, higher emissions per worker are associated with lower exposure to
other drivers, namely, import penetration and ICT capital investment, and lower skill intensity. On the other hand, as expected,
higher green patent intensity is positively associated with ICT capital investments and demand for highly educated workers,
professionals, technicians and managers.
When we examine long-term changes over the period 1995–2007, we do not ﬁnd any co-movements between our measures
of exposure to climate policies and other structural drivers. Any increase in exposure to structural transformations (ICT capital,
trade or emissions intensity) leads to a decrease in hours worked. Interestingly, while sectors that become more intensive in
green patents do not exhibit any positive and signiﬁcant changes in employment, they reinforce their skill biasedness towards
graduate workers and professionals.
We observe another interesting pattern for the climate-related changes in demand for skills. In contrast with ﬁndings of Vona
et al. (2018), sector-country pairs that become cleaner reduce their relative demands for technicians andmiddle-skilledworkers
and increase their demands for unskilled and manual workers. The behaviour of sectors changing their emissions intensities is
at odds with the common wisdom that employment contractions are usually accompanied by skill upgrading. An explanation
of this unexpected pattern requires a more careful treatment of the overlap among different structural drivers, which is the goal
of the cluster analysis in the next section.
3. A taxonomy of exposure to multiple structural transformations
Isolating the association between climate policies and workforce composition is challenging due to the contemporaneous
presence of other structural drivers that have well-known biased effects on labour demand. Climate policies can either reinforce
or mitigate the skill-biased effect of these changes. To consider in a compact way the overlapping of different transformations,
we develop a taxonomy of sector-country pairs based on their degree of exposure to structural drivers affecting labour market
outcomes. Cluster analysis is the most natural method for allowing the data to reveal this taxonomy (e.g., Consoli and Rentoc-
chini, 2015). For the sake of exposition, in the cluster analysis, we organize the data in long intervals delimited by 1995, 1999,
2003 and 2007.10
3.1. Cluster analysis: methodology
The variables used to build the clusters are the following: i) the capital deepening and the technological level of the sector
are captured using both non-ICT and ICT capital stocks per hour worked; ii) exposure to international competition is captured
by import penetration; and iii) GHG intensity and the stock of EPO climate-related patents per hours worked are our primary
and secondary proxies, respectively, for exposure to climate policies.11
Note that the distribution of clustering variables is skewed and characterized by the presence of outliers. Therefore, as a
preliminary step in the search for a meaningful sectoral taxonomy, we transform each variable into percentile ranks to avoid
the formation of clusters driven by extreme values.
The aim of cluster analysis is to identify groups of observations (country-sector pairs) that are distinct, that is, those that i)
are different from the others and ii) group together observations that are homogeneous within the cluster. We adopt a two-
step procedure to identify the optimal composition of clusters, as suggested in Hair et al. (2009). First, we perform hierarchi-
cal clustering to identify the “optimal” number of clusters (Milligan and Cooper, 1985) by assessing how distinct the clusters
are. Second, we use the resulting clusters (and corresponding centroids) as a starting point for the optimal re-attribution of
observations into clusters by means of non-hierarchical clustering. Our favoured clustering algorithm is the average linkage
algorithm, which computes the Euclidean distance in clustering variables across all possible pairs of individuals across differ-
ent clusters and aims to minimize distances within the clusters and, at the same time, maximize distances across clusters.
This procedure provides six main clusters, which are described in the following sub-sections (see Appendix A for technical
details).
10 We checked that our results are unaffected by the particular years selected to delimit the windows.
11 Other variables could have been included as clustering variables, such as the total patent stock and investments in intangible capital, but at the cost of
increasing complexity and losing observations.
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Table 1
Deﬁnition of variables.
Variable Source Years Description Mean Median SD
ICT capital intensity EU KLEMS 1995–2007 Stock of ICT capital per hour worked. 1.4125 0.5748 3.3224
Non-ICT capital intensity EU KLEMS 1995–2007 Stock of non-ICT capital per hour worked. 9.2597 3.8193 21.079
Import penetration OECD STAN 1995–2009 Import/(Output+ Import – Export). 0.5672 0.4358 1.4739
Climate patent stock per empl OECD-REGPAT; Lybbert and
Zolas (2014); OECD-ENVTECH
1995–2011 Stock of EPO patent applications in climate-related technologies.
Patents are attributed to the sectors according to the IPC-ISIC
concordance table proposed by Lybbert and Zolas (2014).
Climate-related technologies are identiﬁed following the IPC-
and CPC-based taxonomy proposed by the OECD ENVTECH
Indicator.
2.5391 0.3805 6.0176
GHG/VA WIOD 1995–2009 Greenhouse gas emissions (CO2, CH4 and N2O expressed in
CO2-equivalent tons) per real value added. The numerator also
includes emissions embodied in the purchase of electricity
(based on input-output estimates).
5.4161 0.7988 26.2186
Managers EU LFS 1995–2011 Share of managers (ISCO 1) 0.0751 0.0649 0.0447
Professionals EU LFS 1995–2011 Share of professionals (ISCO 2) 0.0783 0.0562 0.066
Technicians EU LFS 1995–2011 Share of technicians (ISCO 3) 0.1483 0.125 0.1128
Manual EU LFS 1995–2011 Share of manual workers (ISCO 7, 8 and 9) 0.5903 0.615 0.1601
High education EU LFS 1995–2011 Share of workers with tertiary (ISCED) education 0.1903 0.1653 0.122
Mid education EU LFS 1995–2011 Share of workers with upper secondary (ISCED) education 0.5201 0.5084 0.1656
Low education EU LFS 1995–2011 Share of workers with secondary or lower (ISCED) education 0.2895 0.262 0.1585
Hours worked WIOD 1995–2011 Hours worked by employed and self-employed workers 251.1599 117.8889 335.7974
Energy price IEA; WIOD 1995–2011 Sector-country-year speciﬁc price of energy inputs. The price is
the weighted average of country-year energy-source-speciﬁc
energy prices, using country-sector-year-speciﬁc energy mix as
weight.
0.2484 0.3165 0.2298
Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) OECD EPS Indicator 1995–2011 Environmental Policy Stringency indicator. The indicator has
been standardized to range between 0 and 1.
0.4488 0.1671 0.4811
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Table 2
Correlation between measures of structural drivers and labour force composition in levels (pooled panel for years 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007).
ICT capital intensity
(log)
Non-ICT capital intensity
(log)
Import
penetration
Climate patent stock
per empl
GHG/VA
(log)
ICT capital intensity (log) 1.0000
Non-ICT capital intensity (log) 0.6763 1.0000
Import penetration 0.0886 −0.0018 1.0000
Climate patent stock per empl 0.5005 0.3371 0.0670 1.0000
GHG/VA (log) −0.1805 0.1671 −0.1621 0.0357 1.0000
Managers 0.3385 0.1346 0.0774 0.1039 −0.0350
Professionals 0.6127 0.2932 0.1399 0.3530 −0.2452
Technicians 0.4324 0.2501 0.0702 0.3334 −0.0913
Manual −0.6571 −0.3923 −0.0889 −0.3894 0.1109
High education share 0.6708 0.3665 0.1415 0.4474 −0.2125
Middle education share −0.1983 −0.2276 0.0265 0.2574 0.1207
Low education share −0.2034 −0.0021 −0.1054 −0.4866 0.0115
Notes: Correlations weighted by hours worked. Correlation coeﬃcients not signiﬁcant at the 5% level in italics.
Table 3
Correlation between measures of structural drivers and labour force composition (long differences 1995–2007).
△ ICT capital
intensity (log)
△ Non-ICT capital
intensity (log)
△ Import
penetration
△ Climate patent stock
per empl
△ GHG/VA
(log)
△ ICT capital intensity (log) 1.0000
△ Non-ICT capital intensity (log) 0.2189 1.0000
△ Import penetration 0.1513 0.1085 1.0000
△ Climate patent stock per empl −0.0541 0.0383 0.0334 1.0000
△ GHG/VA (log) −0.0065 −0.1870 −0.1282 0.1366 1.0000
△ hours worked (log) −0.2494 −0.3454 −0.2038 −0.1236 −0.1482
△Managers 0.259 0.0767 −0.0036 −0.0234 −0.0695
△ Professionals −0.1341 −0.0352 −0.0423 0.1198 −0.0719
△ Technicians 0.1233 0.0248 −0.0438 −0.0701 0.2587
△Manual −0.1712 −0.0455 0.0276 −0.0138 −0.1847
△ High education share 0.1890 −0.0494 0.0430 0.1587 0.0305
△Middle education share −0.0076 −0.0305 −0.0576 −0.0454 0.2252
△ Low education share −0.1302 0.0614 0.0174 −0.0749 −0.2116
Notes: Correlations weighted by hours worked in 1995. Correlation coeﬃcients not signiﬁcant at the 5% level in italics.
3.2. Proﬁling of clusters
Table 4 provides a description of the cluster taxonomy by reporting the average percentiles (and the median values in paren-
theses) of clustering variables across the six different clusters, to which we attribute a label.12
We now discuss the features of the six clusters by combining information about the clustering variables (Table 4) with the
dynamics of the clustering variables across different clusters (Fig. 1). Theoretically, we expect that being exposed to multiple
structural drivers is worse than being exposed to a single driver because all structural transformations (except perhaps green
innovations) are potentially labour saving.
Clusters 1 (Brown Global Low-tech) and 2 (Brown Medium-tech) are both characterized by a moderate level of GHG emissions
intensity. The main difference is that cluster 1 is open to trade and is extremely low tech, while cluster 2 is medium tech and
relatively sheltered from international competition. Over time, we observe a convergence of these two clusters in terms of
capital deepening and green patents. Emissions intensity, in contrast, declined twice as fast in cluster 1 as in cluster 2. The ﬁrst
cluster contains a combination of diverse sectors, including Textile and Transport Equipment, while the second cluster is more
concentrated in a few sectors, such as Basic Metals, Food andWood production (Table A2 of Appendix A). Importantly, the Brown
Medium-tech cluster is the largest in terms of average employment share (31.2%), while the Brown Global Low-tech cluster is the
fourth largest (14.8%).
The third cluster (Green Global High-tech) resembles the secondwith two notable differences: i) a signiﬁcantly larger share of
green knowledge and ii) a very modest GHG emissions intensity. This cluster contains the Machinery and Equipment producers
and some Textile, Rubber and Plastics producers (Table A2), and it is the second in terms of size with an average of 20.6% of
12 In the bottom part of the table, we test the differences in ﬁve clustering variables across clusters by running ﬁve separate linear regressions with a clustering
variable as the dependent variable and cluster dummies as independent variables. Not surprisingly, as the cluster analysis seeks to maximize the differences in
clustering variables across clusters, the cluster dummies are jointly (F-test) signiﬁcantly different from zero for all of the clustering variables, and they explain
a signiﬁcant proportion of the overall variance (R squared> 0.6). In the last row of the table, we also enlist pairs of clusters for which clustering variables are
not signiﬁcantly different (based on Scheffe’s test). Note that this outcome is more frequent for ICT capital (6 of 15 possible pairwise comparisons) than for the
other four clustering variables, especially the climate-related ones, corroborating the well-known fact that ICT is a general-purpose technology with a broad
range of applications (Helpman, 1998).
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Table 4
Deﬁnition and proﬁling of clusters (average percentile of clustering variables, median value of variables in parenthesis).
Cluster ICT K
intensity
Non-ICT K
intensity
Import
penetration
Climate patent
stock per empl
GHG/VA n Empl share
1 Brown Global Low-tech 18.43
(0.169)
15.84
(1.069)
67.23
(0.582)
19.76
(0.023)
47.8
(1.121)
164 0.1477
2 BrownMedium-tech 23.72
(0.239)
32.71
(2.452)
24.48
(0.215)
36.54
(0.104)
57.15
(1.627)
144 0.3120
3 Green Global High-tech 64.09
(1.031)
45.4
(3.328)
77.16
(0.726)
62.3
(0.779)
15.4
(0.315)
166 0.2062
4 Exposed to Automation 65.5
(0.901)
62.39
(4.844)
32.21
(0.301)
34.12
(0.085)
38.34
(0.881)
121 0.1950
5 Black Exposed to Mult. Drivers 68.03
(1.212)
79.97
(10.590)
74.06
(0.660)
72.33
(1.655)
69.45
(3.249)
116 0.0724
6 Black High-tech 73.53
(1.662)
83.03
(19.493)
19.64
(0.182)
85.12
(4.794)
85.73
(11.170)
129 0.0667
Total 50
(0.575)
50
(3.819)
50
(0.436)
50
(0.290)
50
(1.265)
840 1
F test of joint signiﬁcance of cluster dummies 332.73∗∗∗ 520.09∗∗∗ 407.15∗∗∗ 392.07∗∗∗ 785.62∗∗∗
Not statistically different (p-value > 0.05) clusters according to Scheffe’s test 1-2, 3–4,
3–5, 4–5,
5-6
5–6 2–6 – –
Notes: For each cluster, we report the average percentile of each variable and the median value of the ‘true’ variable in parentheses. To estimate the F-test of the joint signiﬁcance of cluster
dummies, we run simple OLS regressions with the selected variable as the dependent variable and cluster dummies as independent variables, which are jointly tested. Scheffe’s test of multiple
comparison is derived from the analysis of variance (ANOVA) model.
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Fig. 1. Average period-to-period growth in clustering variables by beginning-of-period cluster weighted by beginning-of-period hours worked (1995–1999; 1999–2003;
2003–2007).
total employment. Notably, the cluster becomes signiﬁcantly greener over time in terms of both green patents and emissions
intensity.
Cluster 4 (Exposed to Automation) is also a large cluster with 19.5% of total employment on average. It collects observations
that remain relatively, but not fully, sheltered from international competition and climate-related transformations. For all of the
clustering variables, the observed growth rates for this cluster resemble those experienced by other clusters.
The last two clusters (Black and Exposed to Multiple Drivers and Black High-tech) are the most emission-intensive clusters,
but they represent, on average, a remarkably smaller share of hours worked (7.2% and 6.7%, respectively). Both score high
on all of the dimensions, especially climate-related ones; the only notable difference is that the Black High-tech cluster has
been fully sheltered from international competition. Both clusters are very concentrated sector-wise: Chemicals and Mining
for cluster 5 and Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear and Electricity Generation for cluster 6. Concerning the trends over time, cluster 6
is the best performer in terms of increases in green patent intensity, while cluster 5 is an outlier in terms of increased trade
exposure.
3.3. The taxonomy at work
Before moving to our econometric analysis, in which we use cluster dummies to ﬂexibly control for exposure to multiple
structural drivers, we assess here the composition and dynamics of different clusters in terms of workforce skills. Table 5 shows
that the differences in labour force composition across clusters go in the expected directions, following a general technology-
skill complementarity argument.
However, as evident in last three rows of the table, the cluster dummies explain only a small proportion of the variance in
our measures of skills, except for manual workers, and the pairwise differences across clusters are often insigniﬁcant, especially
for managers.
Fig. 2 reports the trends in our skill measures across different clusters. We observe that, as expected, hours worked declined
mostly in clusters exposed to multiple drivers and international competition (1, 3, 5), with the exception of the small cluster 6,
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Table 5
Labour market characteristics of clusters.
Cluster Managers Professionals Technicians Manual High-education Mid-education Low-education
1 Brown Global Low-tech 0.0607 0.0396 0.1045 0.7022 0.1023 0.5760 0.3218
2 Brown Medium-tech 0.0608 0.0293 0.0889 0.6850 0.1031 0.4640 0.4330
3 Green Global High-tech 0.0831 0.1162 0.1749 0.5188 0.2504 0.4993 0.2503
4 Exposed to Automation 0.0772 0.0799 0.1260 0.5998 0.1906 0.4838 0.3256
5 Black Exposed to Mult.
Drivers
0.0933 0.1091 0.1869 0.4810 0.2556 0.4839 0.2604
6 Black High-tech 0.0744 0.0913 0.1757 0.5144 0.2255 0.5324 0.2421
Total 0.0718 0.0685 0.1291 0.6105 0.1696 0.4977 0.3327
F test of joint signiﬁcance of
cluster dummies
9.27∗∗∗ 58.63∗∗∗ 43.42∗∗∗ 83.43∗∗∗ 79.77∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗ 20.77∗∗∗
Not statistically different
(p-value > 0.05) clusters
according to Scheffe’s test
1-2, 1–4, 1–5,
1–6, 2–4, 2–5,
2–6, 3–4, 3–5,
3–6, 4–5, 4–6,
5-6
1-2, 3–4, 3–5,
3–6, 4–5, 4–6,
5-6
1-2, 1–4, 2–4,
3–4, 3-5
1-2, 3–4,
3-5
1-2, 3–4, 3–5,
5-6
2-3, 2–4, 2–5,
2–6, 3–4, 3–5,
3–6, 4–5, 4–6,
5-6
1-3, 1–4, 1–5,
3–4, 3–5, 4–5,
5-6
Notes: For each cluster, we report the weighted (with hours worked) average of each variable. To estimate the F-test of joint signiﬁcance of cluster dummies,
we run simple OLS regressions with the selected variable as the dependent variable and cluster dummies as independent variables, which are jointly tested.
Scheffe’s test of multiple comparison is derived from the analysis of variance (ANOVA) model.
which experienced the largest employment decline. Further, while pronounced skill upgrading is widespread, we do not observe
any striking pattern clearly associated with climate-related factors, except for the switch from manual workers to technicians
in the “black” cluster 6.
The fact that the clusters do not reveal pronounced differences in employment patterns is also conﬁrmed in Table 6, in
which we regress the 4-year long-term changes (1995–1999, 1999–2003, 2003–2007, 2007–2011) in employment on lagged
cluster dummies (Panel A) and then on lagged clustering variables (Panel B). Only cluster 1 experienced a signiﬁcant decrease
in employment relative to the other clusters. Importantly, the explanatory power of the initial cluster dummies (Panel A,
column 1) is greater than that of the time-varying lagged clustering variables (Panel B, column 1), justifying the use of
cluster dummies to account for exposure to multiple drivers. Finally, the signs of the two proxies for exposure to climate
policies are in line with our expectations: negative and signiﬁcant for GHG intensity and positive and signiﬁcant for green
patent intensity.
We can conclude that cluster analysis provides a ﬂexible method to control for exposure to multiple drivers, but a fully
ﬂedged assessment of the associations of climate policies and skill-biased employment dynamics should directly include our
two proxies for exposure to these policies. The next section describes the methodology used to estimate this association and the
main results of the paper.
4. Effect of climate policies on skill-biased employment dynamics
There are three types of issues that make the identiﬁcation of the effect of climate policies on employment problematic.
First, the effect of other structural transformations is likely to dominate that of climate policies. Second, not only are there
several climate policies that can be evaluated, but both the initial level and the change in such policies are likely to matter for
employment dynamics. Third, the identiﬁcation of the effect of climate policies is problematic given the unavoidable presence
of omitted variables.
4.1. Estimation equation
To illustrate the strategy that we adopt to tackle these three issues, let us introduce our estimation equation:
ΔYijt = 𝛽1pEij,t−1 + 𝛽2Δp
E
ij,t
+ 𝛾 log(GHG∕VA)ij,1995 + 𝜙cij,1995 + 𝜇i,t + 𝜃j,t + 𝜀ij,t , (1)
where our dependent variable ΔYijt is the change in the share of hours worked in occupation-speciﬁc occupation groups (e.g.,
technicians) or the change in the logarithm of total hours worked in country i, sector j and year t, while 𝜀ij,t is a standard error
term. All regressions are weighted by initial (1995) hours worked in the sector-country pair.
The main variable of interest is the energy price pE
ij,t
. We include both the lagged level and the contemporaneous change in
energy prices, as they both can inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s adjustment of its skill mix. Following Jaeger et al. (2018), we will show that
the effect of the lagged level of energy prices is a good proxy for the cumulative effect of past price changes on the choice of the
current skill mix (see Section 4.3). To address the issue of having multiple environmental policies, we also present the results of
an extended speciﬁcation of equation (1) in which we add the index of Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) developed at the
OECD.
We include ﬁve initial cluster dummies 𝜙c
ij,1995
(the omitted category is cluster 4 Exposed to automation) that account in a
ﬂexible way for the overlapping of the various structural transformations discussed above. The use of initial cluster dummies
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Fig. 2. Average period-to-period growth in labour-related measures by beginning-of-period cluster weighted by beginning-of-period hours worked (1995–1999;
1999–2003; 2003–2007; 2007–2011).
avoids endogeneity problems related to cluster switching, which is, however, not a frequent outcome, as shown in the transition
matrices presented in Tables A3 and A4 of Appendix A. In addition to the cluster dummies, we also include country-by-year 𝜇i,t
and sector-by-year 𝜃j,t dummies that control in a ﬂexible way for trends that have either a sector- (e.g., technological diffusion)
or country-speciﬁc (e.g., the debt crisis) component. We further adjust for the permanent inﬂuence of the initial GHG intensity
(in logs) to capture an additional component of the labour market dynamics of emission-intensive sectors that goes beyond the
inclusion of cluster, country and sector dummies. GHG intensity allows us to fully isolate the labour market effects of climate
policies from the labour market trends of emission-intensive sectors. Finally, as a general rule, we use a log transformation for
those variables (e.g., GHG/VA, total employment)with highly skewed distributions,with few outliers possibly driving the results.
By contrast, energy prices (in constant US Dollars – base year 2005 – per kilogram of oil equivalent – KOE) and the occupational
shares vary between 0 and 1, and their distributions are nearly Gaussian; hence, we do not adopt a log-transformation in these
cases.
Given the ﬁrst-difference speciﬁcation of equation (1), the main source of data variation left to identify the effect of energy
prices is the change in employmentwithin a country-sector pair.We further partial out the country-, sector- and cluster-speciﬁc
(time-varying) components of this variation by including ﬂexible trends for sectors and countries and linear trends for clusters.
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Table 6
Predictive power of cluster dummies vs. clustering variables.
Dep. var:△ log(hours worked) (1) (2) (3)
Panel A – Lagged cluster dummies
1 Brown Global Low-tech −0.0824∗∗∗
(0.0315)
−0.0769∗∗∗
(0.0267)
−0.0142
(0.0151)
2 Brown Medium-tech −0.0115
(0.0148)
−0.0106
(0.0141)
0.0114
(0.0138)
3 Green Global High-tech −0.0118
(0.0203)
0.0055
(0.0127)
−0.0384
(0.0238)
4 Exposed to Automation [base cat] [base cat] [base cat]
5 Black Exposed to Mult. Drivers −0.0087
(0.0146)
0.0021
(0.0153)
0.0324
(0.0224)
6 Black High-tech 0.0020
(0.0187)
0.0126
(0.0222)
0.0560∗
(0.0290)
Controls Year
dummies
Country, sector and year
dummies
Year-speciﬁc country and sector
dummies
R squared 0.143 0.223 0.413
N 840 840 840
Panel B – Lagged clustering variables
Import penetration −0.0112
(0.0095)
−0.0111
(0.0089)
−0.0006
(0.0021)
log(ICT K intensity) −0.0135
(0.0135)
0.0221∗
(0.0119)
−0.0045
(0.0121)
log(Non-ICT K intensity) 0.0183
(0.0122)
0.0075
(0.0111)
0.0099
(0.0091)
Climate patent stock per empl 0.0095∗∗∗
(0.0032)
0.0095∗∗∗
(0.0027)
0.0134∗∗∗
(0.0027)
log(GHG/VA) −0.0106∗
(0.0057)
−0.0130∗∗
(0.0063)
−0.0129
(0.0088)
Controls Year
dummies
Country, sector and year
dummies
Year-speciﬁc country and sector
dummies
R squared 0.132 0.240 0.436
N 840 840 840
Notes: OLS regressions on stacked differences (1995–1999; 1999–2003; 2003–2007; 2007–2011) weighted by hours worked in
1995. Standard errors clustered by sector-country in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
4.2. Endogeneity issues
The set of controls described above are included in equation (1) to mitigate endogeneity concerns in the estimation of energy
price effects. However, it is unlikely that these controls fully absorb the biases associated with variables that are diﬃcult to
observe and vary at the country-by-sector level.
First, negative (positive) demand shocks reduce (increase) the demand for inputs, including labour, and contemporaneously
increase (decrease) energy prices through ex post reductions (increases) in quantity discounts. In a study of the structure of
energy prices in French manufacturing plants, Marin and Vona (2017) ﬁnd that the incidence of quantity discounts is not con-
stant over time and varies substantially both within and between sectors. Because quantity discounts are ultimately correlated
with unexpected demand shocks, this ﬁnding suggests that demand shocks are unlikely to be absorbed by the set of controls
included in equation (1).
The second source of omitted variable bias is associated with unobservable technological shocks. In particular, we expect
changes in the energymix (a proxy for technology) to be correlatedwith changes in the inputmix, including the skillmix. Clearly,
the consequences of a change in the price of, e.g., coal on the input mix are at least partly unobservable to econometricians, who
largely ignore the speciﬁc technological relations linking the demand of skills, on the one hand, and the type of capital equipment
and organizational practices required when using a speciﬁc energy source, on the other.
Taking both sources of bias into account, it is not straightforward to formulate predictions on the direction of the estimation
bias for the effect of energy prices on workforce skills. For total employment, Marin and Vona (2017) show that OLS underesti-
mates (in absolute terms) the negative effect of energy prices because the component of technological shocks that is correlated
with energy prices is relatively more energy-saving than labour-saving and thus more than offsets the bias associated with
unobservable demand shocks. In their study, this implies that the job destruction effect induced by higher energy prices is
larger in the IV than in the OLS estimation.13 If, as indicated by research in labour economics (e.g. Jaimovich and Siu, 2018),
13 Typically, the elasticity of employment to energy prices estimated in previous studies ranges between −0.10 and −0.23 and is higher in energy-intensive
sectors (Deschenes, 2013; Kahn and Mansur, 2013; Marin and Vona, 2017). A recent contribution by Hille and Möbius (2019) decomposes the overall impact of
energy prices on sector-level employment effect of energy prices into different effects: cost to comply with regulation, factor shift and demand. Their dynamic
panel GMM estimator ﬁnds a negligible overall net effect of energy prices on manufacturing employment, with a large cost effect that more than compensates
for the (negative) demand effect and factor shift effect.
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the pace of skill upgrading is accelerated by recessions and negative shocks, we expect larger employment contractions to be
associated with larger skill shifts. Thus, the skill-biased effects should be magniﬁed when using an appropriate IV estimator.
We instrument energy prices by exploiting a classical shift-share logic (Bartik, 1991) that has become common in related
papers estimating the impacts of energy prices (Linn, 2008; Marin and Vona, 2017). Speciﬁcally, the instrument is obtained by
multiplying the vector of sector-country speciﬁc shares of each energy source (coal, gas, electricity, oil) at time 0 (1995 in our
case) by the vector of the time-varying prices of each source at the national level. That is:
IVpE
ijt
=
∑
s
𝜙k
ij,t=1995p
k
i,t
(2)
where 𝜙k
ij,t=1995 is the initial share of energy source k in country i and sector j,
14 while pk
i,t
is the national shift in the price of
energy source k. Since we have two endogenous variables in equation (1), we instrument the change in energy prices with the
change in IVpE
ijt
.
Such instruments only retain the exogenous variation in energy prices and thus mitigate both sources of omitted variable
bias. The exclusion restrictions are satisﬁed as long as two conditions hold: i) the national prices for each source are independent
of sector-level idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks, and ii) the initial energy mix of the sector does not affect long-term
employment dynamics.
These assumptions are impossible to test explicitly. The inclusion of sector-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc trends, which cap-
ture the idiosyncratic features of an energy market (e.g., the political power of large utilities) potentially correlated with energy
prices, mitigate concerns associated with violations of the ﬁrst assumption. However, to lend further credibility to our IV esti-
mations, we will explore the robustness of our results to the exclusion of the electricity sector, i.e., the one that most likely
inﬂuences national energy prices and policies, and to the use of a variant of this instrument where world energy price shifts
replace national price shifts.
As suggested by a recent paper by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018), the plausibility of the second assumption can be assessed
by exploiting the fact that a Bartik instrument is equivalent to using a linear combination of initial shares (i.e., energy source
shares in our case) as instruments. Therefore, a researcher can not only explicitly use over-identiﬁcation tests to assess the exo-
geneity of all instruments, but (more important) she can also study the extent to which important covariates are balanced with
respect to initial energy source shares. Indeed, non-parallel pre-trends or signiﬁcant imbalances in the covariates’ distribution
depending on the initial shares are more likely to indicate imbalances in unobservable variables potentially correlated with the
dependent variable.
Appendix B presents the detailed results of these analyses that we brieﬂy summarize here. Table B1 shows that initial energy
source shares are not balanced with respect to the clustering variables (Panel A), but they becomemore balanced when we used
cluster dummies as in equation (1), with the notable exception of cluster 3 Green Global High-tech. Since excluding this cluster
allows us to achieve a satisfactory balance (Panel C), we perform a robustness check by excluding it when estimating energy
price effects (Panel C of Table C1 in Appendix C). Second, we do not observe signiﬁcant pre-trend differences across sector-
country pairs with different energy mixes (in 1995) during the period 1990–1994 (see Tables B2 and B3), although we can only
conduct these tests on total hours worked and education-based skill measures due to data limitations on occupational shares in
the EU-LFS.15 The effects of energy prices on these variables are not statistically signiﬁcant (see in particular Table B2).
To provide context for our results, Fig. 3 shows that all of our policy measures increased substantially over time. The average
energy price increased by a remarkable 78%,while average EPS stringency (our secondary policymeasure) tripled between 1995
and 2011. Such large increases in energy prices represent an ideal test of the resilience of EU labour markets in advance of the
future adoption of ambitious climate policies.
4.3. Estimation results
Table 7 contains the main results of this study obtained by estimating equation (1) in three ways: i) OLS (Panel A), ii) our
preferred approach, the just-identiﬁed IV (Panel B); and iii) the over-identiﬁed IV, where we can explicitly test for the exogeneity
of all instruments (Panel C). Comparing the three panels, our results indicate a downward bias in the OLS estimates of the effect
of energy prices on sectoral employment. Although the job destruction effect is larger and negative in the IV speciﬁcations,
the joint effect of energy prices changes and levels is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels making the job killing
hypothesis unlikely, especially so given the substantial historical increase in energy prices documented in Fig. 3.16
A downward bias in the OLS estimates of the skill-biased effect is also observed for the contemporaneous change in energy
prices, especially for technicians and manual workers. In contrast, the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient of lagged energy
prices remains unchanged across the different occupational groups (columns 2–5). The plausibility of our identiﬁcation strategy
is further conﬁrmed by the stability of the coeﬃcients in the two IV speciﬁcations (Panels B and C) and by the failure to reject
the null hypothesis of exogeneity for our main variables of interest, namely the employment shares of different occupational
14 Jaeger et al. (2018) and Marin and Vona (2017) suggest the use of a pre-sample energy mix to reduce endogeneity concerns. Unfortunately, sector/country
speciﬁc energy mix fromWIOD is only available from 1995 onwards.
15 Data on hours worked, total and by education-based skill measures, for 1990–1995 were retrieved from the EU-KLEMS database.
16 The p-value of the Chi square test of joint signiﬁcance of ΔpE
ij,t
and pE
ij,t−1 is 0.37.
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Fig. 3. Trends in policy stringency measures.
groups (Panel C, columns 2–5). In both the just-identiﬁed and the over-identiﬁed speciﬁcations, the instruments remain strong
with F-statistics above the usual cut-off of ten (Stock and Yogo, 2002). Table B4 in Appendix B presents the complete details of
the ﬁrst-stage results for both the just-identiﬁed and the over-identiﬁed speciﬁcations.
The novel ﬁnding of our paper is that a weak and insigniﬁcant effect of energy prices on total employment masks signiﬁcant
heterogeneity across occupational groups. On the aggregate employment impact, this ﬁnding contrasts with those obtained
using plant-level data (Marin and Vona, 2017) or ﬁner levels of geographical aggregation (Kahn and Mansur, 2013), which high-
light a modest negative employment effect of higher energy prices. However, this conforms to the fact that the competitiveness
and employment impacts of environmental policies are larger in micro- than in macro-studies (Smith, 2015; Dechezleprêtre
and Sato, 2017). While macro-analyses of policy impacts generally fail to identify causal effects, micro-studies estimate a causal
but partial equilibrium (or local) effect that does not account for the offsetting effect of employment reallocation across regions
and ﬁrms.
Regarding the skill-biasedness of the impacts, climate policies create winners and losers across occupations within a given
industry. Broadly speaking, the skill bias of climate policies is aligned with that of globalization and automation: manual work-
ers are the losers (column 5), while abstract professions are the winners (columns 2–4). A peculiar aspect of climate policies is,
however, that the pronounced bias towards abstract occupations is concentrated among technical occupations (ISCO 3), such
as Physical and Engineering Science Technicians, Process Control Technicians and Government Regulatory Associate Profession-
als. In our preferred IV speciﬁcation of Panel B, the share of technicians increases signiﬁcantly with both the change and the
lagged level of energy prices. Furthermore, while the effects of both the change and the level of energy prices are statistically
insigniﬁcant on managers, we ﬁnd a positive effect on the share of professionals only for the lag of energy prices. This ﬁnding
is consistent with those Vona et al. (2018) for the US Clean Air Act but with the important difference that the bias is towards
low-level technical skills rather than high-level engineering skills.
Thus far, we have interpreted the effect of the contemporaneous change in energy prices as a short-term effect and the effect
of the lagged price level as a long-term effect. To corroborate this interpretation and examine in greater detail the dynamic
adjustment of employment to energy price changes, we follow the approach proposed by Jaeger et al. (2018) by noting that the
current choice of the skill mix is the result of current and past energy price shocks. We augment the speciﬁcation in equation
(1) with lagged changes in energy prices up to year t − m (and adjust the year of the lagged level of energy prices and the
instruments accordingly).17
17 These additional variables are instrumented in a straightforward way, by multiplying the vector of national price changes in year t with the vector of the
energy source shares in 1995. Table B5 reports ﬁrst-stage regressions for the speciﬁcations in Table 8. Each instrument is a good predictor of the endogenous
variable in the same period, which means that there is suﬃcient heterogeneity in the ‘shifts’ (i.e., national source-speciﬁc energy prices).
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Table 7
Baseline estimates.
△ log(hours worked) △Managers △ Professionals △ Technicians △Manual
Panel A – OLS estimates
△ Energy price 0.0432
(0.0480)
−0.0017
(0.0111)
−0.0139
(0.0107)
−0.0007
(0.0178)
0.0241
(0.0243)
Energy price (t-1) −0.0122
(0.0162)
−0.0017
(0.0025)
0.0059∗∗
(0.0025)
0.0130∗∗
(0.0055)
−0.0102
(0.0066)
log of GHG intensity (1995) −0.0005
(0.0030)
−0.0000
(0.0003)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0001
(0.0005)
0.0003
(0.0007)
R squared 0.495 0.437 0.441 0.372 0.313
N 3360 3360 3360 3360 3360
Panel B – IV baseline estimates
△ Energy price −0.0205
(0.0877)
0.0036
(0.0197)
−0.0109
(0.0195)
0.0630∗∗
(0.0313)
−0.0599
(0.0407)
Energy price (t-1) −0.0305
(0.0217)
−0.0016
(0.0030)
0.0081∗∗
(0.0032)
0.0141∗∗
(0.0057)
−0.0135∗∗
(0.0062)
log of GHG intensity (1995) −0.0008
(0.0028)
−0.0000
(0.0003)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0005)
0.0002
(0.0007)
N 3360 3360 3360 3360 3360
F test of excluded IV 58.31 58.31 58.31 58.31 58.31
Panel C – IVs decomposed in their different energy source components
△ Energy price 0.0044
(0.0789)
−0.0049
(0.0179)
−0.0095
(0.0192)
0.0454
(0.0293)
−0.0380
(0.0420)
Energy price (t-1) −0.0258
(0.0231)
−0.0039
(0.0031)
0.0074∗∗
(0.0034)
0.0149∗∗
(0.0059)
−0.0115∗
(0.0065)
log of GHG intensity (1995) −0.0007
(0.0028)
−0.0000
(0.0003)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0005)
0.0003
(0.0007)
N 3360 3360 3360 3360 3360
F test of excluded IV 33.14 33.14 33.14 33.14 33.14
Sargan test of overid (J stat) 11.42 3.601 2.091 8.633 8.984
p-value of the Sargan test 0.0761 0.731 0.911 0.195 0.174
Notes: Regressions weighted by hours worked in 1995. Standard errors clustered by sector-country in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include year-speciﬁc country dummies, year-speciﬁc sector dummies and initial (1995) cluster
dummies.
Table 8 presents the results of this extension for three speciﬁcations including, one, two or three lags of energy price changes.
We stopped at three lags because adding further lags reduces the strength of the instruments below the usual cut-off of ten. The
upshot of these regressions is that the effect of the lagged level of energy prices is very persistent and remains statistically
signiﬁcant even with a lag of four years. Further corroborating our main ﬁnding, the effect of the sum of the coeﬃcients asso-
ciated with energy prices is statistical signiﬁcant for manual workers and technicians only. Overall, these results support our
interpretation that the effect of lagged energy prices approximates well past cumulative changes in energy prices.
The analysis of the adjustment process suggests that we can use our main speciﬁcation in Table 7 to quantify the estimated
effects. To discipline such quantiﬁcation, note that our data indicate a catching-up in energy prices whereby larger increases
occurred in sector-country pairs with lower initial prices. We thus build an upper and a lower bound of the price effect corre-
sponding to the 1st quartile (0.31 US dollars per kilogram of oil equivalent – koe) and the 3rd quartile (0.62 USD/koe) of the
energy price distribution, respectively. Using an auxiliary regression of the change in energy prices on the lagged level of energy
prices plus year, sector and country dummies, we compute the short-term predicted change in energy prices at the 1st and the
3rd quartile of the distribution. The upper and lower bounds of the short-term effect are obtained by multiplying these pre-
dicted changes by the estimated coeﬃcient of the energy price change (Panel B of Table 7). Similarly, we compute the upper
(resp. lower) bound of the cumulative effect of past price changes by multiplying the estimated coeﬃcient of the lagged energy
price by the inter-quartile change (resp. the 90th – 0.82 USD/koe – to 75th – 0.62 USD/koe – change) in energy prices.
In Table 9, the long-term effect is the sum of the current and the cumulative past changes, and we compare it with the
historical change in the employment shares for each occupation group (column 3). Focusing on technicians and manual workers
for whom the long-term effects are statistically signiﬁcant across different speciﬁcations, the effect is remarkably larger for the
former than for the latter group. The historical increase in energy prices explains only a modest fraction (i.e., between 4.2% and
8.0%) of the large decline in the share of manual workers’ employment between 2011 and 1995. By contrast, the effect of energy
prices on technicians ranges between 9.2% and 17.5%.
4.4. Extensions
We summarize here the results of a series of additional regressions that have twomain aims: i) providing further support for
the plausibility of our empirical strategy and ii) extending and reinforcing our main results. For the sake of space, we relegate
all details of these analyses to Appendix C.
G. Marin and F. Vona / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 98 (2019) 10225316
Table 8
Dynamic adjustment model.
△ log(hours worked) △Managers △ Professionals △ Technicians △Manual
Panel A – One lag
△ Energy price −0.0481
(0.102)
0.0026
(0.0229)
−0.0196
(0.0230)
0.0630∗
(0.0324)
−0.0537
(0.0441)
△ Energy price (t-1) 0.0933
(0.0864)
0.0189
(0.0250)
0.0624∗∗
(0.0253)
0.0191
(0.0310)
−0.0325
(0.0434)
Energy price (t-2) −0.0256
(0.0233)
−0.0027
(0.0031)
0.0075∗∗
(0.0034)
0.0122∗∗
(0.0060)
−0.0129∗∗
(0.0059)
log of GHG intensity (1995) 0.0000
(0.0029)
0.0002
(0.0003)
−0.0002
(0.0004)
0.0005
(0.0006)
−0.0002
(0.0007)
Cumulative effect of△ Energy price 0.0452
(0.126)
0.0215
(0.0279)
0.0428
(0.0306)
0.0820∗
(0.0460)
−0.0861
(0.0581)
N 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150
F test of excluded IV 45.66 45.66 45.66 45.66 45.66
Panel B – Two lags
△ Energy price −0.0550
(0.1134)
0.0049
(0.0232)
−0.0166
(0.0241)
0.0600∗
(0.0344)
−0.0371
(0.0471)
△ Energy price (t-1) 0.1051
(0.0986)
0.0155
(0.0287)
0.0684∗∗
(0.0299)
0.0180
(0.0389)
−0.0065
(0.0515)
△ Energy price (t-2) 0.0223
(0.1103)
0.0192
(0.0255)
−0.0024
(0.0284)
−0.0226
(0.0492)
−0.0335
(0.0537)
Energy price (t-3) −0.0298
(0.0236)
−0.0052∗
(0.0031)
0.0059
(0.0037)
0.0127∗
(0.0071)
−0.0152∗∗
(0.0069)
log of GHG intensity (1995) −0.0000
(0.0030)
0.0001
(0.0003)
−0.0003
(0.0004)
0.0004
(0.0005)
−0.0000
(0.0007)
Cumulative effect of△ Energy price 0.0722
(0.146)
0.0396
(0.0344)
0.0495
(0.0373)
0.0554
(0.0511)
−0.0771
(0.0615)
N 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940
F test of excluded IV 27.38 27.38 27.38 27.38 27.38
Panel C – Three lags
△ Energy price −0.0506
(0.113)
0.0025
(0.0241)
−0.0165
(0.0249)
0.0612∗
(0.0347)
−0.0312
(0.0486)
△ Energy price (t-1) 0.0919
(0.0996)
0.00896
(0.0308)
0.0735∗∗
(0.0315)
0.0068
(0.0370)
0.0192
(0.0528)
△ Energy price (t-2) 0.0230
(0.1393)
0.0326
(0.0312)
−0.0025
(0.0372)
−0.0318
(0.0603)
−0.0297
(0.0672)
△ Energy price (t-3) 0.0426
(0.1381)
−0.0319
(0.0249)
0.0171
(0.0325)
0.0312
(0.0436)
−0.0127
(0.0530)
Energy price (t-4) −0.0296
(0.0248)
−0.0063
(0.0040)
0.0058
(0.0044)
0.0158∗∗
(0.0071)
−0.0207∗∗∗
(0.0078)
log of GHG intensity (1995) 0.0009
(0.0031)
−0.0000
(0.0003)
−0.0003
(0.0004)
0.0006
(0.0005)
−0.0001
(0.0007)
Cumulative effect of△ Energy price 0.107
(0.173)
0.0122
(0.0379)
0.0716
(0.0439)
0.0675
(0.0545)
−0.0543
(0.0734)
N 2730 2730 2730 2730 2730
F test of excluded IV 13.87 13.87 13.87 13.87 13.87
Notes: Regressions weighted by hours worked in 1995. Standard errors clustered by sector-country in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include year-speciﬁc country dummies, year-speciﬁc sector dummies and initial (1995) clus-
ter dummies.
Table C1 presents a ﬁrst set of robustness checks, where we address some problematic issues of our empirical strategy. To
mitigate concerns regarding the inﬂuence of speciﬁc sectors on national prices, the results in Panel A are obtained using world
rather than national energy prices as shifts to build our instrument. While, not surprisingly, both the strength of the excluded
instrument and the precision of the estimates decline substantially, we ﬁnd that the technician-biased employment change is
conﬁrmed. The same issue is addressed in Panel B by excluding the power sector from the analysis. The results are again in line
with the main results for technicians but are weakened for manual workers.
In Panel C, we exclude the cluster Green Global High-Tech that is signiﬁcantly different from other clusters in terms of initial
energy source shares (Table B1). In addition to the fact that the effect on manual workers is smaller, the main notable difference
is that the effect on total employment becomes negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This implies that, once the positive effect
of environmental policies on employment in greener sectors is shut down, the effect in the remaining sectors, mostly emission-
intensive sectors, is negative as found in more micro-level studies (e.g. Kahn and Mansur, 2013; Marin and Vona, 2017). Finally,
Panel D presents the results of an enriched speciﬁcation in which we further adjust our estimates by controlling for the initial
level of all clustering variables (e.g., ICT capital, import penetration). Reassuringly, we do not detect any signiﬁcant change in the
estimated coeﬃcients relative to the main speciﬁcation; thus, we conclude that cluster dummies account well for differences in
clustering variables.
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Table 9
Quantiﬁcation of the effect of energy prices on workforce skills.
Δ short-term effect/Δshare95,11 Δ cumulative effect/Δshare95,11 Δtotal effect/Δshare95,11
Managers [0.005, 0.010] [−0.027, −0.050] [−0.022, −0.040]
Professionals [−0.004, −0.009] [0.038, 0.070] [0.034, 0.062]
Technicians [0.025, 0.050] [0.067, 0.124] [0.092, 0.175]
Manual (negative) [0.011, 0.023] [0.031, 0.057] [0.042, 0.080]
Notes: In italics statistically signiﬁcant effects. Short-term effects are obtained as follows. First, we regress the change in energy
prices on the lagged level of energy prices plus year, sector and country dummies. Second, using the estimated coeﬃcients from this
auxiliary regression, we compute the short-term predicted change in energy prices at the 1st and the 3rd quartile of the energy price
distribution. Finally, the upper and lower bounds of the short-term effect are obtained by multiplying these predicted changes by
the estimated coeﬃcient of the energy price change (Panel B of Table 7). Similarly, we compute the upper (resp. lower) bound of the
cumulative past effect by multiplying the estimated coeﬃcient of the lagged energy prices by the inter-quartile change (resp. the
90th to 75th change) in energy prices.
In Table C2, we evaluate whether the precision of our estimated coeﬃcients depends on the methodology chosen to cluster
standard errors. As energy price policies vary mostly at the country level and affect sectors only through differences in the
energy mix, we adopt two alternative clustering methods: i) by country and ii) two-way clustering (Cameron et al., 2011). The
statistical signiﬁcance of our results does not decline when using different methods; by contrast, the estimated effect of the
change in energy prices on the share of manual workers becomes more precise and statistically signiﬁcant.
Table C3 presents the results of a long-difference speciﬁcation, where we replace yearly changes with 4-years changes in
equation (1). This speciﬁcation is used as an alternative to the dynamic adjustment model presented in Table 8 to address the
nonstationarity of our dependent variables.18 We ﬁnd larger long-term impacts than those estimated through equation (1) and a
stronger effect on professionals (positive) and total employment (negative). Note, however, that this difference in themagnitude
of the effects could be due to the fact that we take arbitrary 4-year windows (1995–1999, 1999–2003, 2003–2007, 2007–2011)
rather than exploiting in full our the variation in our data.
In Table C4, we enrich the main speciﬁcation to account for two additional variables: i) the effect of other environmental
policies (Panel A) and ii) the role of green innovation (Panels B and C). For the ﬁrst extension, the additional policy variables
of interest are the interactions between the lagged and the change in the EPS index, on the one hand, and the initial GHG
intensity, on the other. Both variables are properly instrumented, with details given in Appendix C. Overall, we ﬁnd that the
biased employment effect of energy prices in favour of technicians is reinforced by other environmental policies. In Panel B, we
explore the role of green innovation, proxied by the distance to the sectoral green technological frontier in terms of green patent
stock per employee. We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant association between employment dynamics and the distance to the green
frontier. However, our results in Panel C show that, as expected, sectors closer to the frontier are able to transform the challenge
of higher energy prices into an opportunity to create jobs (column 1), especially technical jobs (column 4).
Finally, Table C5 replicates Table 7 for different dependent variables: labour productivity (value added per hour worked)
and the shares of high-, medium- and low-skilled workers deﬁned in terms of educational attainment, university graduates,
high-school graduates and lower secondary graduates or less, respectively. The main takeaways from these tables are that skill
biases are not evident when using an education-based measure of skills. Moreover, while polluting sectors experienced lower
productivity growth and skill upgrading, an increase in energy prices has a positive short-term effect on productivity growth,
which resonates with ﬁndings of Albrizio et al. (2017) concerning the effects of the EPS index on TFP growth. We leave a more
detailed examination of the effects of energy prices on labour productivity to future research.
5. Concluding remarks
Our paper investigates the effects of energy prices on the demand for workers with different skills. We ﬁnd that the skill bias
of climate policies mostly consists of a substitution of technical and, to a lesser extent, professional workers for manual workers.
While the main skill-bias pattern is broadly consistent with that of other structural transformations, such as globalization and
the ICT revolution, we observe for climate policies a more marked re-direction toward technical and scientiﬁc skills (i.e., non-
routine cognitive skills) relative to managerial and social skills (i.e., non-routine interactive skills).
This result, which is reinforced when also considering other climate policies, indicates that investing in technical skills can
signiﬁcantly reduce the socio-economic costs of a high carbon price scenario. On the one hand, expanding the supply of such
skills will decrease the hourly wages of technical workers and thus production costs. Note that the well-known orientation of
the German educational system towards technical and vocational skills may be one of the key factors explaining the German
leadership in green production. On the other hand, the debate over a just transition of the workforce (Rosemberg, 2010) can be
informed by our ﬁndings, which can give guidance for retraining manual workers for middle-skill technical jobs for green tasks.
By providing fresh opportunities to workers who bear the bulk of the costs of the low-carbon transition and other structural
transformations, such retraining policies will increase the political acceptability of climate policies (Vona et al., forthcoming).
18 We use the Harris-Tzavalis stationarity test, which is designed for panels such as ours that have small T and large N. The null hypothesis of the unit root is
rejected for all of our dependent variables in ﬁrst differences, while it is not rejected for total employment in levels. The results are available upon request.
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Importantly, energy prices did not contribute to the swift decline in employment in polluting industries, in contrast with the
ﬁndings from the micro-econometric literature. This gap between macro and micro ﬁndings reveals once again an aggregation
bias in the evaluation of the economic effects of environmental policies (e.g., Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Dechezleprêtre and Sato,
2017). Nevertheless, the mechanisms by which modest to large effects for the treated companies in polluting sectors translate
into negligible effects at the sector level are not clear. In our paper, we begin to investigate the mediating effects of green
technology, and we ﬁnd some evidence that the effect of energy prices becomes negative and signiﬁcant on total employment
once greener sectors are excluded.
This paper is a ﬁrst step towards understanding the distributional labour market impacts of climate policies. Although we
ﬁnd evidence of distributional impacts in terms of changes in demand for different groups of workers, the next step should be
to examine the effects on wages, which may be different from that on labour demand, especially in countries with centralized
wage-setting institutions. Examining wage effects would be particularly important to assess the distributional impacts, espe-
cially on the most vulnerable manual workers. In this work, we refrain from examining the impact of climate policies on wages
for two reasons. First, estimating wage premiums for speciﬁc skill categories at the industry level introduces additional sources
of bias related to compositional effects and self-selection regarding unobservable worker characteristics. Second, institutional
differences in wage-setting rules across EU countries should be considered, which would add another layer of complexity to our
analysis. This analysis is left for future research usingmatched employer-employee data combinedwith detailed data on the skill
requirements of occupations, which are better suited for an analysis of the transitional costs of climate policies as dependent on
skill gaps (e.g., Walker, 2011; Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010).
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